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Abstract 
Under traditional Chinese socialist ideology, labour is not considered as a 
commodity, and wages are not viewed as the price of labour. Market oriented 
economic reform initiated in the late 1970s, however, has brought some changes to 
this politically sensitive area—pricing and allocation of labour, especially in the 
rural industrial sector, are now much more sensitive to market pressures. This paper 
surveys the performance of labour markets in China's rural industrial sector after 10 
years of economic reform. It examines whether conventional models of wage 
determination, modified to reflect the peculiar circumstances of the Chinese rural 
labour market, can be used to explain variations in wages in this sector of China. It 
is found that after only a decade of change, the pattern of wage determination in 
rural China has many parallels with wage  determination in Western countries. 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Bob Gregory, Paul Miller, one of my Ph.D thesis examiners and an anonymors 
referee for helpful comments and to the National Centre for Development Studies at the Australian 
National University for financial assistance. 
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An Examination of Wage Determination in China's Rural Industry 
Sector 
I. Introduction 
Under traditional Chinese socialist ideology, labour is not considered as a commodity 
and wage is not the price of labour.1 Conventional economic models of the pricing 
and allocation of labour, which emphasise the interaction of supply and demand 
factors, have little relevance in this setting. The relevance of supply and demand 
interactions to the explanation of labour market phenomena in China was increased, 
however, by the market oriented economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s. These 
reforms began in 1978 when a so-called household responsibility system was 
introduced in rural areas. This system leased land property to individual households 
and gave them decision-making power over the issues which concern production and 
income distribution. A major consequence of these changes has been the rapid 
economic development of an industrial sector in rural China. By 1985, around 20 per 
cent of the rural labour force was engaged in the rural industrial sector, which is 
referred to as the TVP sector (township-, village- or privately-owned enterprises). Its 
total value of output accounted for about 44 per cent of the gross rural social product 
in 1985.2 
The impacts of the market oriented economic reforms in the late 1970s on wage 
determination and labour allocation in China's rural industrial sector are reviewed in 
this paper. The main aim is to examine through empirical tests whehter conventional 
models of wage determination, modified to reflect the peculiar circumstances of the 
Chinese rural labour market, can be used to explain variations in wages and 
                                                 
1 The logic behind this is that properties in a socialist country belong to the people of the country, and, 
therefore, workers are masters of the country. Consequently, workers are the employers of the 
industries and they can not sell themselves to themselves. 
2 See Township and Village Enterprises Statistical Material, 1978-85 (Bureau of Township and Village 
Enterprises, 1987). 
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occupational distributions in this sector of China. It is found that after only a decade 
of change, the pattern of wage determination in rural China has many parallels with 
wage  determination in Western countries. The empirical analyses are based on 1985 
cross-sectional data.3 These data were collected by the World Bank and the Institute 
of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1986 and 1987.4 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes how the labour 
market in the TVP sector differs from the typical Western labour market. Section III 
examines whether the pattern of wage determination in the TVP sector can be 
explained by the human capital model. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. Decision making in the rural labour market in China 
Before economic reform in 1978, labour mobility, employment and wage levels in 
China were all fully controlled by the central authority. Everybody was supposed to 
have a job, but at the same time no one had a choice over the type of work 
undertaken. In the rural areas, people who were born in a village had to work there for 
their entire life. The rules of the job assignment varied from time to time and from 
place to place. Officially, job assignment was supposed to take equality of income 
distribution into consideration. In practice, however, it was very often that nepotism 
in appointment dominated in this regard. 
                                                 
3 Five questionnaires were designed for the township, village and private enterprises sample survey: a 
Workers Survey Questionnaire (WSQ) for TVP employees; an Enterprise Survey Questionnaire (ESQ) 
for management teams of sample firms; an Enterprise Director Questionnaire (EDQ) for directors of 
sample firms; an Enterprise Quantitative Questionnaire (EQQ), filled out by accountants of sample 
firms; and a Township Leader Questionnaire (TLQ). The total number of firms included in the survey 
is 121. The ESQ, EDQ and EQQ each sampled 121 firms. The WSQ was conducted in 46 firms of the 
total 121 sample firms, and the total number of observations is 1174. The main part of this study is 
based on the Workers Survey Questionnaire. 
4 Four counties were involved in the survey: Wuxi county in Jiangsu province, Nanhai county in 
Guangdong province, Jieshou county in Anhui province and Shangrao county in Jiangxi province. 
These four counties represent different levels of rural industrialization and different degrees of 
administrative control or different ownership structures. These four types of development conditions, 
particularly from the point of view of rural industrialization, should approximately represent the 
situation in most areas of rural China. 
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Individual income distribution in the rural areas in this period followed a work point 
system: each individual labourer's work points were evaluated against each day of 
work among the members of the production team to which she/he was assigned. Full 
points per day for a healthy man aged 20-45 were usually 10. However, the value of 
these work points in terms of money was unknown until the end of the year. At the 
end of each year, the net distributable income of a production team was divided by the 
total work points earned by all members who worked in the production team. 
In the sub-sections that follow, attention is drawn to the way that economic reform 
has resulted in changes to the methods of labour allocation and wage determination in 
the TVP sector. 
The situation of employment decision making 
Generally speaking, early economic reform did not change the employment system 
very much in the TVP sector. This can be seen from the information listed in Table 1 
on the methods of obtaining the job held at the survey date (1985). Thus, in response 
to the question: "How did you get the job in this firm?" about 43 per cent of the 
sampled employees reported that they were assigned to the job by the local 
authorities. Another 23 per cent got their jobs by social contact with community or 
firm leaders. Only a low proportion of workers acquired their jobs through their own 
efforts in the market (which includes the choices of through examination and through 
own effort in Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The way jobs were obtained in the TVP sector. 
 
Choices Frequencies Percentage 
Assigned by local authorities 445 42.6 
Through examination 168 16.1 
Through own effort 133 12.7 
Through resource pooling 54 5.2 
Introduced by friends and relatives 244 23.4 
Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire. 
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Nevertheless, there are some changes in the TVP's recruitment system. Figure 1 
shows the correlation between the years of tenure5 and the proportion of employees 
assigned to their jobs by local governments, and the proportion of those who obtained 
employment through their own effort. The figure shows that among people with 
tenure of one year, about 17 per cent were assigned to their jobs, while among those 
with tenure of eight years, about 70 per cent were assigned to their jobs. The 
proportion of those who found their jobs through their own effort is 48 per cent 
among the one-year tenure group and 20 per cent among the eight-year tenure group. 
This implies that eight years ago (1978) most employees were assigned to their jobs, 
while in 1985, the proportion of employees who found the jobs through a market 
mechanism increased to about 50 per cent and the proportion assigned by the 
authorities decreased to 17 per cent. In other words, the importance of the market 
mechanism has grown substantially in recent years. 
Figure 1 
Institutional change of the TVP employment system 
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5 Tenure is measured as the actual years of employment at a firm. 
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The other aspect of the employment relationship that may be examined with the data 
available is dismissal. Dismissal is a very politically sensitive issue in China because, 
as the master of the country, workers were not supposed to be dismissed by anyone. 
Despite this, around 97 per cent of the directors surveyed in Jieshou, 82 per cent in 
Wuxi, 73 per cent in Nanhai and 68 per cent in Shangrao thought they had power to 
dismiss employees. However, the average number of workers dismissed by each firm 
in 1985 was less than one person in all four counties. With such a small number of 
workers actually being fired by firms, the economic reform, which were expected to 
increase the dismissal rate, must in fact, have had little impact on this characteristic of 
the laobur market. In this respect the picture with regard to dismissals is quite 
different from that for recruitment outlined above. This difference, and the sharp 
difference between the views of directors and the practical record of dismissing 
workers, can be explained by political and social constraints which were not yet 
affected by the economic reform. For example, some communities in Wuxi issued 
regulations that prevented enterprises from dismissing employees unless they found 
new jobs. Each dismissal had to be approved by the community authority (Meng, 
1990). The principal reason for all dismissals among the surveyed firms in 1985 was 
violation of the worker regulations6.  
Wage determination 
Income distribution for the rural industrial sector in the old commune system was 
quite complicated. The workers in these enterprises, drawn from production teams, 
were paid within the same work points payment system as those who worked in the 
fields. Enterprises had to transfer a certain amount of their revenue to each of the 
production teams in proportion to the number of workers supplied. Workers did not 
get paid until the end of the year and were paid directly by their production team 
                                                 
6 Such as fighting with co-workers, destroying machines, etc. 
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according to the work points they earned from the team. They were not paid directly 
by the enterprise. 
After the introduction of the household responsibility system in 1978, the income 
distribution system in the agricultural sector changed dramatically. The production 
team, which had been the basic accounting unit, lost most of its administrative and 
economic functions. Both production and income distribution were now operated 
within families. Under these circumstances, it was impossible and meaningless for 
those who worked in the enterprises to have their income distributed within their 
home production team (now called the group of villagers). Therefore, the income 
distribution system of the commune and brigade enterprises was transformed from the 
old work point system to a within-firm wage system in the 1978-83 period. During 
this transformation period, various wage systems appeared, for example, within-firm 
work points system; fixed cash wage, which took wage levels in state-owned 
enterprises as the point of reference (but the wage paid was normally slightly lower); 
and half fixed cash wage which was paid monthly plus half within-firm work points, 
paid at the end of the year. 
1983 was a turning point for the TVP sector: the production responsibility system was 
introduced to most of the township- or village-owned firms. This meant that the 
enterprises had more power over managerial decision making. Privately-owned rural 
non-agricultural enterprises were encouraged. And the majority of these enterprises 
switched to a monthly cash wage system. 
The cash wage system links an individual's work effort with his/her payment more 
directly than the work points system, and gives an individual greater incentive to 
work hard. Specifically, most of the firms adopted a piece-rate wage system if it was 
possible. For those jobs which were impossible to count by piece, a time-rate wage 
supplemented by a bonus system was adopted. 
 8 
Apart from this change of payment system, there was also a considerable 
decentralization of decision-making in regard to the wage level. While this area was 
highly controlled by the local authorities, in 1985, over 60 per cent of firms in the 
sample claimed that they had decision making power over wage and bonus 
determination. 
The effect of special labour market decision making on wage determination in 
the TVP sector 
The main difference between the TVP labour market and the theoretical construct 
analysed in conventional economic theory is obvious: the neoclassical modelis built 
upon the situation in which individual firms take a market wage level as given and 
choose the quantity of employees to maximize their profits, while in the case of the 
TVP labour market, firms seem rarely to have decision making power over the 
quantity of employment, and, instead of being a pre-determined variable, the wage is 
mostly an endogenous variable to the TVP firms.  
Recent developments in theoretical labour economics have provided one theory that 
may explain part of the behaviour of firms in the TVP sector. Thus, efficiency wage 
theory (see, for example, Stiglitz, 1974 and Solow, 1980, 1985) modified the standard 
neoclassical labour market model by letting firms use the wage as a means of 
encouraging employees to stay with the firm, so as to minimise training costs, and as 
a means of inducing greater (optimal) effort from workers. This theory is normally 
used to explain the phenomenon of the simutaneouse existence of unemployment and 
above-market-level wages. 
The situation in the TVP sector is slightly different from those described by the 
standaard efficiency wage model. The main differences are as follows. In the case of 
the TVP labour market, the attachment of the firm and the employees is exogenous. 
Firms cannot freely hire or fire employees. However, the only alternative employment 
opportunity for employees (agricultural employment) can only provide lower income 
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to them as labour productivity in the agricultural sector is lower than that in the TVP 
sector7. Therefore, employees in the TVP sector will not choose to quit to obtain 
lower wages given that the TVP firms pay employees according to their labour 
productivity. But, if the firm does not pay its employees fairly they may choose to 
shirk. If shirking is detected, the workers' wage level can be decreased.8 This situation 
has two major impacts. First, it prevents firms from paying employees lower than 
their alternative wage since they will choose to quit from the TVP sector. Second, 
where firms pay their workers fairly, it is expected that the workers will respond by 
providing sufficient effort. 
Under these circumstances, how would firms react to maximize their profit?9 The 
firm's problem can be viewed as an attempt to choose the wage level in order to 
encourage its employees not to shirk. Equivalently, the problem is to choose a wage 
level that will induce the effort level from the employees that will maxmize the firms 
profit. This problem can be written as: 
 
                                                 
7 A study by Meng and Huang (1994) shows that marginal productivity is much higher in the TVP 
sector than in the agricultural sector in China. Stiglitz (1982) also points out that "efficiency wage 
considerations may be important in both the rural and urban sectors; but there is no reason that the 
efficiency-wage function should be the same in the two sectors (since the nature of the work performed 
is so different, as are the environmental factors which affect the effect of wages on productivity). Thus, 
the wages paid in the two sectors may differ markedly." 
8 Because of this, monitoring is extremely important for the TVP firms. That is why they normally 
choose a piece-rate payment when it is possible, as it can be seen as a perfect monitoring mechanism 
with the lowest cost. 
9 Byrd (1987) gives a detailed explanation when he assumes Chinese firms in the state-owned 
enterprises have an objective of profit maximisation. His explanation is even more relevant to the TVP 
case. 
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where  is profit, 
 p is price of output, 
 w is wage rate, 
 e is effort provided by each individual, 
 L is labour input which is a constant in the short-run, 
 K is capital stock which in the short-run is assumed to be a constant, 
 r is rent for capital, 
 f[e(w)L, K] is the production function.  
The first order condition of this problem is: 
 pf w Le e=  (2)10 
fe is the partial derivative of f with respect to e or the marginal product of effort, we is 
the partial derivative of w with respect to e or the marginal wage of effort. w Le  
represents the marginal cost of effort. The result of equation (2) means that in order to 
maximise its profit the firm has to pay each individual at the wage level where the 
value of the marginal product of effort is equal to the marginal cost of effort. 
Several points are evident from the above analysis. First, it is clear that the role of 
wage in the TVP firm is to induce effort from each individual so as to maximise the 
firm's profit. Second, in order to achieve this, the firm has to pay individuals at the 
wage level where the value of their marginal product of effort equals their marginal 
cost of effort.  
However, the above analysis is based on the rather strong assumption that individuals 
are homogenous with respect to their provision of effort. If we relax this 
homogenouty assumption by accepting the fact that individuals in reality are different 
in terms of their effort supply, it is obvious that individuals who provide different 
levels of effort will receive different wage rates, provided firms can monitor effort. 
Then, if as believed, the individual's productivity can be increased through 
augmentation of human capital (namely education level, years of labour market 
                                                 
10 For a detailed derivation, see Appendix A. 
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experience, etc), individuals could expect to get the market rate of return to their 
investment in human capital.  
More specifically, the following propositions may be stated: (1) Labour market 
experience should have a significant impact on wage determination as it has a direct 
impact on labour productivity. (2) The impact of education on individuals' wage 
determination depends on whether it affects labour productivity. In the case where the 
level of technology is very low and the required skill level is very low, education may 
not have a significant impact on labour productivity. Therefore, it may not affect 
individual wage determination in some parts of the TVP. 
To sum up, there are two hypothesis need to test according to the model established 
above: (1) Wage level is likely to be determined by labour productivity in the TVP 
sector. And (2) by and large, human capital theory should be applicable to the wage 
determination in the TVP sector. 
III. Empirical test 
Normally, productivity of effort is very hard to measure as the cost of monitor is too 
hight. However, for some kind of production, where the quantity and quality of output 
can be counted by piece, mornitoring cost is relatively low. In this case, productivity 
of effort can be directly related to the pieces of work completed, and hence to the 
piece-rate payment.  
In the sample we used for this study, 40 per cent of employees are paid by piece-rate 
and their earnings can be considered as a direct measure of labour productivity. If we 
group the data into those paid by piece-rate and those paid by time and compare the 
results, we might be able to test if the employees in the TVP sector are paid according 
to their labour productivity.  
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To test the applicability of human capital model in the TVP wage determination, 
earning equations are estimated for the total male employees first, and then for the 
two occupational groups separately. 
According to many applications of the human capital model, schooling and work 
experience, including general labour market and firm-specific skills, are the factors 
that have the most significant impact on individual wage determination. In an 
application across areas that differ appreciably in terms of economic development, 
there is also expected to be a regional element to wage determination. The basic 
human capital model is, therefore, specified as: 
Model 1: 
 ln(w)=a+b1S+b2FT+b3FT2+b4OJ+b5OJ2+b6RE+u 
where w is daily wage;  
 S is years of schooling;  
 FT is firm-specific tenure;  
 FT2 is firm-specific tenure squared; 
 OJ is other job experience;  
 OJ2 is other job experience squared; 
 RE is a vector of regional dummies.  
This model is generalised in a number of ways. When the data were collected most 
TVP firms had existed for fewer than 10 years and most employees were farmers 
before they were employed by the firm. Model 2 therefore is specified to capture the 
relationship between the wage level and agricultural and non-agricultural experience.  
Model 2: 
 ln(w)=a+b1S+b2FT+b3FT2+b4ONAJ+b5ONAJ2+b6AEXP+b7AEXP2+b8RE+u 
where ONAJ is other non-agricultural experience; 
 ONAJ2 is other non-agricultural experience squared; 
 AEXP is agricultural experience; 
 AEXP2 is agricultural experience squared. 
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Finally, it is generally argued that wages in different types of work may incorporate a 
compensating differential that accommodates peculiar disamenities associated with 
that work. Accordingly, the wage-generating function is often expanded to include 
variables for the type of work undertaken. Reflecting this, both models are also 
estimated with a dummy variable for occupation of employment. In this regard, total 
employees are divided into two groups, staff and workers. Staff refers to those who 
are engaged in managerial and technical work. The workers group refers to those who 
are engaged in physical labouring work. The occupation variable has staff coded as 1 
and workers as zero. 
The results of the models described above for all male employees are reported in 
Table 2 and the results with the data disaggregated according to occupation of 
employment are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
OLS results of models of wage determination,  
China's TVP sector, 1985. 
 
 models 
 1 211 
 without ocp with ocp without ocp with ocp 
 n=529 n=525 n=457 n=454 
Constant 1.016 1.089 1.068 1.154 
 (10.69) (11.44) (9.89) (10.87) 
Schooling 0.011 -0.0002 0.007 -0.007 
 (1.63) (-0.003) (0.85) (-0.81) 
Firm tenure (FT)     
FT 0.028 0.021 0.032 0.024 
 (2.80) (2.15) (2.91) (2.19) 
FT2 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0007 
 (1.93) (-1.61) (-2.15) (-1.77) 
Other job experience (OJ)     
OJ 0.029 0.027 (a) (a) 
 (5.48) (5.12)   
OJ2 -0.0006 -0.0006 (a) (a) 
 (-3.83) (-3.89)   
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)     
ONAJ (a) (a) 0.023 0.019 
   (3.76) (3.12) 
ONAJ2 (a) (a) -0.0005 -0.0004 
   (-2.91) (-2.65) 
Agri. experience (AEXP)     
AEXP (a) (a) 0.025 0.022 
   (3.18) (2.89) 
AEXP2 (a) (a) -0.0005 -0.0005 
   (-2.02) (-1.94) 
Occupational dummy (a) 0.144 (a) 0.177 
  (3.53)  (4.13) 
County dummy     
Jieshou -0.274 -0.265 -0.309 -0.293 
 (-6.28) (-6.16) (-6.36) (-6.19) 
Shangrao -0.441 -0.427 -0.495 -0.472 
 (-8.19) (-7.72) (-8.77) (-8.10) 
Nanhai 0.529 0.524 0.481 0.478 
 (7.70) (7.54) (6.61) (6.56) 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared 47.02 (8) 55.44 (9) 47.64 (10) 51.72 (11) 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.37 0.34 0.36 
Note: [1] 't' statistics are presented in parentheses. 
[2] FT is firm tenure; AEXP is agricultural experience; OJ is other labour market experience, 
excluding firm tenure; ONAJ is other non-agricultural experience. 
[3] (a)=variable not entered. 
[4] Breusch-Pagan χ2 tests for heteroscedasticity. The degrees of freedom for the χ2 statistics 
are presented in parentheses 
                                                 
11 By deleting observations with negative values of work experience in the residual categories the 
sample size for model 2 is reduced by about 15 per cent.  
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Table 312:  
OLS results of models of wage determination by occupational groups* 
 
model 1 model 2 
workers staff workers staff 
n=271 n=262 n=230 n=230 
Constant 0.967 1.466 1.012 1.494 
(7.56) (9.96) (7.23) (9.22) 
Schooling -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003 
(-0.08) (-0.87) (-1.09) (-0.29) 
Firm specific tenure (FT)     
FT 0.049 0.0002 0.057 -0.002 
(3.47) ((0.02) (3.86) (-0.13) 
FT2 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.002 0.0002 
(-2.91) (0.23) (-3.39) (0.32) 
Other job experience (OJ)     
OJ 0.015 0.031 (a) (a) 
(1.89) (4.66)   
OJ2 -0.0002 -0.0007 (a) (a) 
(-0.77) (-3.96)   
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)     
ONAJ (a) (a) 0.024 0.014 
  (2.82) (1.66) 
ONAJ2 (a) (a) -0.0005 -0.0004 
  (-1.92) (-1.20) 
Agri. experience (AEXP)     
AEXP (a) (a) 0.012 0.026 
  (1.03) (2.92) 
AEXP2 (a) (a) -0.0002 -0.0007 
  (-0.35) (-2.36) 
County dummies:     
Jieshou -0.219 -0.299 -0.212 -0.347 
(-3.70) (-4.96) (-3.21) (-5.35) 
Shangrao -0.222 -0.648 -0.256 -0.694 
(-2.87) (-7.80) (-2.96) (-8.07) 
Nanhai 0.821 0.211 0.774 0.190 
(8.22) (2.93) (7.35) (2.44) 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared13 36.31 (8) 7.05 (8) 29.96 (10) 9.21 (10) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.33 0.40 0.35 
*: For notes to Table see Table 1. 
                                                 
12 In this table, the results for the workers group (both model 1 and model 2) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity (using White's consistent covariance matrix). There is no heteroscedasticity problem 
for the staff group. The 't' statistics presented in the table for the staff group use the OLS covariance 
matrix. 
13 The critical Chi-Squared value at the 5 per cent significance level for n=8 is χ2=15.51; for n=10, 
χ2=18.31. 
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The salient features of these results can be discussed in two groups: those relating to 
the impact of experience on wages and those relating to the impact of schooling on 
wages. 
Experience. Experience is an important determinant of wages. Other job experience 
(total experience minus firm tenure) and firm tenure are statistically significant and 
are associated with a rate of return of about 2.5 to 3 per cent for each additional year 
of experience over most of the first decade of work. This is similar to the pattern of 
experience effects reported in studies of Western labour markets (see, for example, 
Polachek and Siebert, 1993). When other job experience is further disaggregated into 
agricultural experience and non-agricultural experience (see model 2 of Table 2), the 
estimates of the coefficients appear very similar across the experience variables. This 
suggests that the source of labour market experience is largely irrelevant, though the 
result is a little surprising in that one might not expect a close relationship between 
learning experience in agricultural and non-agricultural jobs. However, when the total 
male sample is disaggregated into workers and staff sub-groups (Table 3) the situation 
becomes clearer.  
For workers, firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience are statistically 
significant, with firm tenure having the greater impact on workers' wage 
determination. Agricultural experience is insignificant for workers. These results 
accord well with human capital theory. As individuals' experience in the firm or in 
other non-agricultural jobs increases, their labour productivity is expected to increase. 
Consequently, their wage should increase. 
For staff, however, the most important source of experience seems to be agricultural 
employment. Other non-agricultural experience ranks second. Firm tenure seems 
unimportant. Two conjectures are offered concerning these results: (1) As noted in 
section II, most employees were assigned to their position by the community 
authorities. Moreover, the community authority normally assigned the leaders of the 
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production team or the brigade to be the management staff of the firm. The rank and 
starting wages in the firm reflected the length of the time that individuals were 
agricultural leaders. This might be the reason for the strong relationship between 
agricultural experience and wages for staff. Once they become staff members and 
gain experience in one firm, they are often assigned to a new firm as a higher level 
staff member. If the wage level set for the staff depended on firm tenure (either in the 
old or the new firms) they would be reluctant to move. Hence, there is no strong link 
between firm tenure and earnings but there is such a link between other non-
agricultural job and earnings. (2) Management skills learned in agricultural and other 
non-agricultural sectors are easily transferred to management in the enterprise. 
These conjectures are tested by further disaggregate both staff and workers group into 
piece rate and time rate group and estimate model 2 for all these groups. The results 
presented in Appendix A show that different experience variables have exactly same 
impact on both piece rate and time rate groups within each occupational group. For 
the workers group, firm tenure and other non-agricultural experience have significant 
impact on wage levels for both piece rate and time rate groups, but agricultural 
experience hardly has any impact on both groups wage determination. For staff, only 
agricultural experience matters for both piece rate and time rate groups. These results 
suggest the reason that the different experience variables have different impact on 
workers and staff wage determination is more likely to be a productivity oriented 
phenomena. 
Education. Education has been shown in most studies of Western labour markets to 
be a key determinant of the income distribution (see, for example, Psacharopoulos, 
1985). The most unusual result for the analysis of the male labour market in the TVP 
sector is an insignificant effect of education on individual wage determination. The 
poor performance of the education variable is a characteristic of both the analysis of 
the total male sample (Table 2) and of the analysis based on data disaggregated into 
workers and staff groups (Table 3). The return to education is at most 1 per cent for 
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the total male sample and appears to be negative for the disaggregated data. A 
question naturally arises as to whether this unusual result reflects a labour 
productivity effect or socially determined rules of payment. 
We estimated models 1 and 2 for piece-rate and time-rate male employees separately. 
The restults are presented in Appendix B. Statistical tests revealed that the processes 
of wage determination for the two groups were the same14. In particular, the results 
suggest that, once again, schooling is statistically insignificant for both groups, a 
result that holds no matter which specification of experience is adopted. As piece-rate 
earnings are a direct measure of productivity it appears that education does not affect 
labour productivity in the TVP sector. 
From the perspective of the evidence on the wage-education relationship in western 
labour markets, the results for the TVP sector are a puzzle. However, examination of 
the nature of production in many of the firms leads us to the following explanation. In 
the TVP firms many jobs are unskilled and productivity would be the same for all 
workers in these jobs, regardless of level of education. Hence it would be expected 
that eduction would not be important in terms of wage determination. 
Analysis of the institutional change of employment system in the TVP sector may 
also further our understanding of the role of education in TVP wage determination. 
As mentioned in Section II, among those who had tenure of 8 years (being employed 
at 1978), about 70 per cent were assigned to their jobs, and only 20 per cent found 
their jobs through their own efforts. Among those who had tenure of 1 year (being 
employed at 1985) 48 per cent found employment through their own efforts, while 
only 17 per cent were assigned to their jobs. This shows the gradual liberalization of 
the TVP employment system. 
                                                 
14 F-tests are conducted to see whether the wage structures are the same for the piece rate and time rate 
groups. For model 1 F(9, 529)=1.40 and for model 2 F(11, 457)=1.22. They are both less than the 
critical value of F(9, ∞)=1.88 and the critical value of F(11, ∞)=1.83, so the null hypothesis of no 
structural change for both models cannot be rejected. 
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To exploit this characteristic of the data, the sample was disaggregated into market 
(those who found their jobs through their own efforts) and non-market (those who 
were assigned to their jobs) groups15, and wage equations were estimated for the two 
groups separately (Meng, 1992)16. The most interesting result from these estimations 
is that education is significant for the market group but insignificant for the non-
market group, the coefficient of schooling for the market group is 0.039 with a t-
statistic of 3.13 while for the non-market group it is -0.007 with a t-statistic of -0.68. 
However, even the return to education for the market group, at around 4 per cent, is 
considerably lower than the 7 per cent to 10 per cent reported for the U.S. 
(Psacharopoulos, 1985). 
The main concern raised by the above results is why education is significant for the 
market group but not for the non-market group. Does this reflect labour productivity 
effects? To examine this question, both the market and non-market groups are sub-
divided into piece-rate and time-rate groups and human capital wage equations 
estimated for each sub-sample. The results17 from this experiment indicate that 
education is a significant determinant of wages for both piece-rate and time-rate 
employees in the market group, while it is insignificant for both piece-rate and time-
rate employees in the non-market group.  
Hence, it is not the method of payment that leads to the difference between the impact 
of education for the market and  non-market groups. Rather, it must be something to 
do with the underlying nature or philosophy of the two types of employment. In this 
regard, one reason why education might have a significant impact on labour 
                                                 
15 Freedom of choice is the most important distinction between a market economy and a planned 
economy. In terms of the labour market, this freedom of choice is most obvious in terms of 
employment choice. In a market economy, any employer may hire any worker, and any worker may 
work for any employer. However, employment is highly controlled by the authority in a planned 
economy. Accordingly, these two groups (those who find their job by their own effort and those who 
are assigned to their job) are referred to as the market and non-market groups respectively. 
16 See Meng (1992) Table 6.2 in Chapter 6. 
17 See Meng (1992) Table 6.3 in Chapter 6. 
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productivity for the market group but not for the non-market group might be that the 
underlying technological processes of the work undertaken by each group are 
different. Because of these technological differences, people involved in higher 
technological production need to be more educated compared with those who 
undertake more simple jobs. 
To develop this explanation, assume there are two different kinds of firms, one 
employing high technology and the other low technology. Before economic reform, 
most of the TVP firms probably employed low technology. Some might have 
employed high technology but were not allowed to choose high quality employees 
according to the firms' technological requirements. The gradual liberalization of the 
TVP labour market has allowed firms with higher technology to hire employees 
according to their educational level. And most importantly, because firms are allowed 
to choose the quality of their employees, more new firms may start to employ high 
technology. Education has a significant impact on these high technology firms' labour 
productivity, and productivity is rewarded.  
Firms whose technology is relatively low, however, remain with the old recruitment 
system. They also pay their employees according to labour productivity. However, 
education does not increase labour productivity in the low-skill jobs that predominate 
in these firms.18 
This speculation can be reinforced by a steeper tenure-earnings profile for the market 
group compared with the non-market group (Figure 2). It suggests that firm-specific 
training is more important for the former than for the latter, and this in turn suggests 
that the underlying technological level for the market group may be higher than for 
the non-market group. 
                                                 
18 The argument here is suggesting that technology alone is insufficient in the sense that is requires 
certain economic environment in order to take effect. This augument could be testable by linking 
technology to educational requirement and different institutional settings had the variable of firms' 
technology level been avialable.  
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Figure 2 
Comparison of tenure-earnings profiles between the market and non-market 
groups 
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Source: Workers Survey Questionnaire. 
Does education, therefore, play no role for the non-market group? Although education 
does not seem to affect earnings for the non-market group, perhaps it brings with it 
other rewards.  
In the human capital literature, there is a controversy about whether education affects 
wages via its impact on labour productivity or only as a screening device. The logic 
behind the screening device hypothesis usually consists of two steps. First, schooling 
provides information about an individual's innate productive capabilities which 
determine the individual's job assignment; second, the individual's occupational level 
in turn determines his/her earnings.  
Although it is difficult to disentangle these two hypotheses empirically, it is possible 
to test whether the TVP sector uses schooling as a signal to assign employees to a 
certain level of occupation for both the market and non-market groups. This is tested 
 22 
by adopting an occupational assignment19 logit model. This model capture how the 
variables (education, firm tenure and other job experience) which affect demand 
decisions for an occupation affect the probability  of individual i working in 
occupation j. The model is given as: 
 P prob y oc e
e
ij i j
x
x
k
J
i j
i k
= = =
′
′
=
∑( )
β
β
1
 i=1, ..., N,     j=1, ..., J. 
where N=sample size, 
 J=number of occupational groups 
 xi=a vector of exogenous variables affecting supply and demand 
 factors 
We use this model to test whether education plays a significant role in TVP 
occupational assignment. 
The results of the binomial logit model for the total sample and for the market 
oriented and non-market oriented groups separately are reported in Table 4. The 
workers group is used as a reference category. 
                                                 
19 This model was originally called an occupational attainment model (Brown, Moon and Zoloth; 
1980). In our case, it was community authorities who assigned people to their job. Therefore, I refer to 
it as an occupational assignment model. 
 23 
Table 4  
Binomial logit estimates of male occupational attainment: 
(0=workers, 1=staff) 
 
Variables Total Sample Market Non-Market 
Constant -5.359 -5.599 -5.125 
 (-8.17) (-5.26) (-6.11) 
EDU 0.470 0.503 0.43 
 (8.29) (5.58) (5.94) 
FT 0.098 0.154 0.086 
 (4.28) (3.22) (3.16) 
OJ 0.093 0.12 0.085 
 (6.02) (4.26) (4.47) 
JS -0.288 -0.721 -0.697 
 (-1.03) (-1.77) (-1.15) 
SR -0.166 -1.992 0.641 
 (-0.45) (-2.75) (1.41) 
NH 0.428 0.252 0.337 
 (1.19) (0.37) (0.80) 
 
Note20: (1) For total sample, 
  n=420, maximum likelihood=231.05, χ2=119.2, pseudo R2=0.205. 
 (2) For the market oriented group, 
  n=192, maximum likelihood=96.06, χ2=72.36, pseudo R2=0.274. 
 (3) For the non-market oriented group, 
  n=228, maximum likelihood=132.32, χ2=62.5, pseudo R2=0.19 
According to the results presented in Table 6,21 three main human capital variables 
(education, other job experience and firm tenure) are significant determinants of 
occupational assignment for the total sample of employees. Education is the most 
important variable affecting the probability of becoming a staff member. Other job 
experience and firm tenure rank second and third respectively. The other variables do 
not seem to be important in determining an individual's occupation. Similar results are 
                                                 
20 The formula for the Chi-squared measure is χ2=-2(lnLr-lnL), where lnLr and lnL are the log-
likelihood at the maximized value with the constant term only and the log-likelihood at the maximized 
value with all regressors in the model, respectively (Greene, 1990). The formula for the pseudo R-
squared measure is R2=1-(lnLr/lnL) (McFadden, 1974). 
21 A likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the coefficient vector is zero indicates that for all three 
samples the estimated model is highly significant. 
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obtained for the market and non-market-oriented groups. It is of interest that in the 
non-market group education plays an important role on occupational attainment 
whereas it has no impact on earnings. 
The results of the binomial logit model (workers and staff) for the market and non-
market groups suggest that education is an important determinant of occupational 
attainment for both groups. And the marginal effect of education on the probability of 
becoming a staff member is even stronger for the non-market group than for the 
market group (0.012 and 0.0055, respectively).  
The binomial logit model discussed above is generalized in Meng (1992) to consider 
the assignment of employees to each of six occupational groups: workers and five 
sub-groups of staff, namely shift leaders, operational personnel, technical personnel, 
ordinary staff and middle level staff. This disaggregation provides results that 
reinforce the discussion here. In particular, it suggests that people with more 
education are not only more likely to be in the staff groups, but also more likely to be 
in a higher level of management staff group. 
There is one final aspect of the wage structure that can be examined to further our 
understanding of the way wages are determined in the TVP sector. And this is the 
impact of occupation on earnings determination for the market and non-market 
groups. This issue can be examined by estimating a wage equation with occupational 
dummies for each group. Relevant results are reported in Table 5. These results 
indicate that for the market group the effect of education is consistent with the theory. 
More education brings about a higher occupational level, and this in turn brings more 
earnings.22 For the non-market group, however, the results suggest that although the 
TVP uses education as a criterion for job assignment, the level of occupation is not a 
significant determinant of earnings. 
                                                 
22 This can be proved by the fact that when the occupational dummies are added in, the rate of return 
to education decreases and becomes statistically insignificant for the market group. 
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Table 5 
The regression results of model 3 for market and non-market groups 
(workers=0) 
 Market 
n=190 
Non-Market 
n=226 
Schooling 0.0158 -0.020 
 (1.28) (-1.52) 
Occupational dummies   
Shift Leaders 0.196 0.040 
 (1.95) (0.37) 
Operational Personnel 0.257 0.051 
 (1.88) (0.44) 
Technical Personnel 0.261 0.042 
 (2.81) (0.37) 
Ordinary Staff 0.100 0.175 
 (0.86) (1.72) 
Middle level Staff 0.423 0.313 
 (3.61) (3.09) 
Note: The regressions also include the variables included in the models listed in Table 2. The results 
for the whole model are reported in Meng (1992). 
This is indeed a puzzle. If education has neither a direct nor indirect (through 
occupation) effect on wage determination for the non-market group, why do some 
people still invest in education? Furthermore, if occupation does not have an impact 
on wage determination, what is the motivation for people to seek to be promoted? 
Perhaps people invest in education because this is necessary to achieve a high level 
occupation which might be correlated with non-wage benefits. For example, being a 
staff member means that there is no need to undertake heavy labour; individuals can 
gain a good reputation; and may have priority when attempting to establish 
employment opportunities for their children and relatives. In other words, payment in 
the TVP firms contains both wage and implicit benefits. If these non-wage benefits 
are considered as part of income, we might be able to find a significant effect of these 
occupational dummies on income determination. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
measure non-wage benefits in these data and incorporate them into the regression. 
 26 
One survey question, however, can partly provide support for the relationship 
between the level of occupation and non-wage benefits. The question asks all the 
directors of the surveyed firms: "How many of your family members are there in your 
firm?" The survey results show that on average each of 115 directors in the sample 
has 2.65 family members employed in his/her own firm. 
To sum up, it is clear that the relationship between education and earnings in the TVP 
sector reflects productivity effects. It is shown that for both the market and non-
market groups the TVP firms paid their employees according to their labour 
productivity. Education, however, has an important impact on labour productivity for 
the market group but not for the non-market group. This relationship can be detected 
directly from the regression results.  
Nevertheless, education does play an important role in individual's occupational 
assignment for both the market and non-market groups in the TVP sector. Employees 
with higher education are more likely to be assigned to a higher occupational level. 
For the market group, there is a direct correlation between occupation and earnings. 
For the non-market group, it cannot be directly observed from the estimation of a 
wage equation. It may be captured, however, in some kinds of non-wage benefits. 
The above analysis shows that although the TVP labour markets have some distinct 
features compared with the labour market defined in neoclassical theory, the human 
capital model can still explain their wage determination pattern to a certain extent. To 
illustrate further the relevance of the human capital model to wage determination in 
the TVP sector, it is used as the basis for an examination of the gender wage 
differential in the TVP sector. 
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IV. Gender wage differential in the TVP sector 
Female employees account for about 45 per cent of the total sample. In general 
women earn 20 per cent less than men in the TVP sector. To understand wage 
determination in the TVP sector, it is important to know the nature of any structural 
differences of wage determination between the male and female labour markets, and 
the role of pay discrimination. 
The wage differential between gender groups may be caused by two different factors: 
(1) a difference in productivity, and (2) discrimination. Within the second category, 
there are two potential sources of discrimination—wage discrimination within the 
same occupation and discrimination in the distribution of the male and female work 
forces across occupations. 
In the labour economics literature, Blinder's (1973) wage decomposition is widely 
used to capture the labour productivity difference and discrimination within an 
occupation, while Brown, Moon and Zoloth's (1980) model is generally used to more 
comprehensively incorporate the effect on wages of differences in the distributions of 
males and females across occupations. In particular, Brown, Moon and Zoloth (1980) 
decomposed the total wage differential between men and women into components 
related to within-occupation wage differences and occupational differences. Each of 
these components contains a labour productivity effect and a discrimination effect. 
Brown, Moon and Zoloth's comprehensive approach was used to decompose the 
gender wage differential in the TVP sector. The results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Decomposition of gender wage differentials  
 
 value % of total 
Total LDW differential 0.2231 100.0 
Intra-occupational 0.1707 76.5 
Justifiable (PD) -0.0501 -22.5 
Unjustifiable (I+WD) 0.2208 99.0 
Inter-occupational 0.0524 23.5 
Justifiable (QD) 0.0213 9.6 
Unjustifiable (OD) 0.0311 13.9 
Total justifiable -0.0288 -12.9 
Total unjustifiable 0.2519 112.9 
 Note: LDW=daily wage in log term; 
 PD=gender wage differential due to productivity effect of occupational distribution; 
 I+WD=gender wage differential due to discrimination of occupational distribution; 
 QD=gender wage differential due to within occupational productivity differential; 
 OD=gender wage differential due to within occupational discrimination. 
In this analysis, the total gender wage differential is decomposed into an intra-
occupational (within occupational) gender wage differential and an inter-
occupational wage differential (gender wage differential due to different occupational 
distributions for males and females). Among each of these categories, gender wage 
differentials are further decomposed into a portion labelled justifiable, which is the 
portion of the gender wage differential which can be explained by the gender 
difference in personal endowments, and a portion labelled unjustifiable, which is the 
wage differential that cannot be explained by the gender difference in personal 
endowments. This part of wage differential is normally referred to as gender wage 
discrimination. 
The Table 6 results show that there is a 22.31 percentage point differential in the 
mean wage of men and women. Of this, intra-occupational wage discrimination 
(which accounts for 99 per cent of total wage differential) is far more important than 
the wage impact of discrimination of occupational distribution (which accounts for 13 
per cent of total wage differential). The fact that the discrimination components add to 
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more than 100 per cent is due to the fact that the justifiable intra-occupational 
component is negative—a result which implies that within each occupation, females 
possess more of the factors that lead to higher wages than males (i.e., for some 
occupational groups, females have more education or experience and for other groups 
they have favourable regional distribution.). 
Several similar studies have been undertaken for both developed and developing 
countries. It is found that in developed countries like the U.S., U.K. and Australia, 
within occupational wage discrimination is the main cause of the gender wage 
differential (Brown, Moon and Zoloth, 1980; Miller, 1987; Hawke, 1991). However, 
for the developing countries, like Sudan, gender wage differences are much smaller 
within occupations than across the labour market as a whole (Cohen and House, 
1992). 
It is interesting to relate the results of the Brown Moon and Zoloth (1980) 
decomposition to what is known about the decision making processes with regard to 
wages and occupation in the TVP sector. The explanation of why there is greater 
within-occupational discrimination but less discrimination of occupational 
distribution is as follows: In the TVP sector, the decisions of occupational distribution 
are mainly made by the local government while the decisions of within-occupational 
wages are mainly made by the directors of firms. This distinction appears to have an 
important bearing on why where is greater within-occupational discrimination but less 
discrimination of occupational distribution, and some comments are in order. 
As a representative of higher level governments, community authorities aim to fulfil 
economic, political and sometimes ideological targets set by the central and provincial 
governments. A political and ideological target set by the communist government in 
China is equality of opportunity and income. Since traditionally women have been 
treated extremely unfairly in China, the government has paid greater attention to 
improving the position of women in society. In rural township and village enterprises, 
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community authorities have an incentive to implement this kind of government policy 
(which determines the promotion of the officials in the community authorities). 
Therefore, when they make decisions regarding the occupational distribution, they 
tend not to strongly discriminate against women.23 
Within-occupational wage determination mainly depends on the tastes of the directors 
of the firms. Government opinion does not have a strong influence on individual wage 
determination in the TVP sector. Therefore, the following points might be able to 
explain the serious within-occupational wage discrimination: 
(1) Traditionally, gender discrimination is very serious in China, especially in rural 
areas. The TVP sector appears to have followed this tradition. 
(2) The TVP firms have monopsony power. In most rural areas in China, employment 
opportunities are scarce outside the home township or village. The only alternative is 
to work in the agricultural sector which has even lower income. If this is the case, 
they pay a lower wage to female employees than to male employees. The women 
have to accept this situation. 
V. Concluding remarks 
It is useful at this stage to draw together all the empirical evidence provided in the 
paper to depict a comprehensive picture of the wage determination system in the TVP 
sector. 
The TVP sector is a newly developed sector, having emerged out of the economic 
reform period. Its system of labour allocation and income distribution has undergone 
a gradual change from a highly controlled system towards one that is more market 
oriented. Up to 1985 (the year this study has investigated), the TVP labour market 
                                                 
23 Further discussion of these issues can be found in Meng (1992). 
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appeared to be a mixture of old and new systems: on the one hand, employment was 
still mainly controlled by the local community authorities, and dismissal was hardly 
allowed; on the other hand, the majority of firms had decision-making power over 
wage setting. 
The human capital model is based on the assumption that there is a competitive labour 
market. To be able to analyse wage determination in the special mixed labour market 
that the TVP sector represents, we proposed a special function for wage determination 
in a situation where local governments allocate labour and the wage is not used to 
attract employees to the firm. It was conjectured that the wage in the TVP sector is 
used to encourage employees not to shirk, and to induce work effort from each 
individual. To do this, employees are paid according to their marginal productivity of 
effort so that extra productivity is rewarded. Hence, it is hypothesized that the human 
capital model should be applicable to individual wage determination within the TVP 
sector. 
The empirical results seem to confirm our speculation: experience variables have a 
significant impact on wage determination when they can be directly connected to 
human capital accumulation (firm tenure for workers and agricultural experience for 
staff), while they are insignificant when they are more age-related (agricultural 
experience for workers).  
More interestingly, the results suggest that education does not affect the wage level 
when the level of skill of the job is low (for the case of the non-market group). But 
when firms adopt higher technology, education affects labour productivity and labour 
productivity is rewarded in the TVP sector (for the case of the market group). 
Apart from these interesting results, gender wage discrimination seems to play an 
important role in the TVP's wage determination. Above 90 per cent of the gender 
wage differential falls into the category labelled "intra-occupational unjustifiable 
differential", which is generally referred to as gender wage discrimination. The reason 
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for the serious gender wage discrimination in the TVP sector is that it arises from the 
combination of Chinese tradition and the fact that TVP firms are single buyers in 
China's rural labour market. 
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Appendix A: 
Model 2 for piece rate and time rate groups by occupation 
 
workers staff 
piece rate time rate piece rate time rate 
n=100 n=130 n=48 n=182 
Constant 1.081 0.967 1.532 1.540 
(6.54) (4.66) (4.23) (8.10) 
Schooling 0.004 -0.030 -0.011 -0.003 
(0.25) (-1.44) (-0.41) (-0.23) 
Firm specific tenure (FT)     
FT 0.055 0.062 -0.021 -0.012 
(3.07) (2.62) (-0.34) (-0.61) 
FT2 -0.0014 -0.002 0.001 0.0003 
(-2.02) (-2.51) (0.49) (0.72) 
Other non-agr. exper. (ONAJ)     
ONAJ 0.024 0.025 0.054 0.014 
(1.91) (1.60) (1.56) (1.52) 
ONAJ2 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.0004 
(-2.43) (-0.62) (-1.80) (-1.00) 
Agr. experience (AEXP)     
AEXP 0.004 0.023 0.049 0.024 
(0.30) (1.09) (2.02) (2.44) 
AEXP2 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0007 
(-0.12) (-0.54) (-1.14) (-2.14) 
County dummies:     
Jieshou -0.373 -0.130 -0.281 -0.370 
(-5.02) (-1.22) (-2.42) (-4.81) 
Shangrao -0.341 -0.341 -0.543 -0.772 
(-3.60) (-1.93) (-3.32) (-7.30) 
Nanhai 0.638 0.841 -0.041 0.232 
(4.03) (6.89) (-0.20) (2.61) 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared24 48.5 (10) 8.5 (10) 8.6 (10) 8.1 (10) 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.40 0.366 0.34 
                                                 
24 Only the standard errors of the estimates for the piece rate workers are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4 
Human capital models for male piece rate  
and time rate employees separately: 
model 1 model 2 
piece rate time rate piece rate time rate 
n=166 n=363 n=147 n=310 
Constant 1.041 1.011 1.038 1.012 
(7.12) (8.20) (6.78) (7.42) 
Schooling 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.010 
(0.91) (1.54) (0.58) (0.91) 
Other job experience (OJ)     
OJ 0.026 0.033   
(2.53) (5.38)   
OJ2 -0.0006 -0.0006   
(-2.19) (-3.65)   
Firm specific tenure (FT)     
FT 0.045 0.019 0.05 0.024 
(2.84) (1.42) (3.1) (1.56) 
FT2 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.0006 
(-1.66) (-0.89) (-2.0) (-1.19) 
Other non-agri. exp. (ONAJ)     
ONAJ   0.026 0.025 
  (2.45) (3.39) 
ONAJ2   -0.001 -0.0005 
  (-2.7) (-2.50) 
Agricultural expe. (AEXP)     
AEXP   0.031 0.027 
  (2.14) (2.87) 
AEXP2   -0.001 -0.0006 
  (-1.64) (-1.83) 
County dummies:     
Jieshou -0.339 -0.261 -0.356 -0.287 
(-5.01) (-4.60) (-5.30) (-4.60) 
Shangrao -0.381 -0.591 -0.441 -0.621 
(-5.10) (-8.18) (-5.40) (-8.40) 
Nanhai 0.524 0.521 0.488 0.471 
(4.01) (6.60) (3.61) (5.57) 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Squared25 44.60 (8) 25.03 (8) 49.3 (10) 27.9 (10) 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.34 
 
                                                 
25 The critical χ2 values for n=8 and n=10 at the 5 per cent significance level are the same as shown for 
Table 5.6. In this table the standard errors in all four regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
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